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Manisha Priyam finds that state-level political strategies and the contested interaction of interest groups
and institutions are important elements in determining the outcome of educational policy reforms. 
The policy changes that initiated economic reforms in India in the 1990s and the politics associated with this
process have been widely debated in the global arena. However, the politics of educational reforms have not
received comparable attention. Writing about Latin America in “Crucial Needs, Weak Incentives”, Robert Kaufman
and Joan Nelson observe that the politics of ‘first-phase’ macro-economic reforms are examined extensively while
‘second-phase’ social sector reforms receive belated and scant attention. This is true of India as well. Part of the
reason for this limited attention is the difference in the nature of these two policy reforms—economic policy changes
tend to have an immediate impact on daily lives whereas reforms in education and health involve slow changes to
complex administrative machineries.
Besides, much of the recent research on school reforms and politics has been dominated by formal political
economy approaches, drawing mainly from the discipline of economics. Analysis based on this framework has not
been able to explain how reforms are successfully adopted, and primarily views the role of politics in a negative way.
I focus instead on understanding political dynamics in successful cases; in particular, I ask why political leaders and
public officials support educational reforms even though it may not suit their political calculations and is likely to
encounter resistance from teacher unions and educational bureaucracies?
I use the framework of comparative institutionalism to understand these dynamics in the implementation of primary
school reforms in India, initiated following the World Bank’s funding of the District Primary Education Programme in
1993, the country’s first-ever loan from the Bank for primary education. My goal is to examine the contested
interaction of ideas, interests and institutions in the course of implementing changes in two important arenas of
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educational policy reform: the management of teacher interests and their unions and educational decentralisation.
My research focuses on two states, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, and analyses the implementation of reforms from
1994 to 2011. Both states were educationally backward at the beginning of the 1990s and confronted with a
common agenda for reforms established by the federal government. Political leadership at the time of reforms was
also similar with power in the hands of regional parties – the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh and the Janata
Dal in Bihar – thought of as being closer to popular sentiments and elected on the basis of extensive support from
disadvantaged social castes. These similarities led one to expect that Andhra Pradesh and Bihar’s political leaders
would implement pro-poor policies with similar enthusiasm. However, the two pursued divergent trajectories, with
Andhra Pradesh achieving higher levels and reduced disparities in primary school participation. My research finds
that differences in political strategies are important in determining variations in outcome.
In Andhra Pradesh, the political leadership of Chandra Babu Naidu found an alignment between the new
opportunities provided by the federal government and its own agenda for development pursued in terms of
globalisation and liberalisation. While resistance from teacher unions was anticipated, the political leadership was
able to deflect it by creating new allies for change among these very groups through the strategic use of the
educational policy. With respect to teacher management, key measures taken included reducing discretion in
policies for transfer and posting (viewed as a very important cause of ‘rent-seeking’), opening more avenues for
promotion, and quicker grievance redress at the mandal (district) level. Politically, the state played on inter-union
rivalries between the largest Panchyati Raj Teachers Unions (PRTU) and the Government Teachers Association—a
political process that created a support base for implementing new policies among the PRTU.
In East Godavari district, I found that the government’s reform team was led by leaders and activists of the State
Teacher’s Union (STU), backed by the leftist political party, the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M). Although
the CPI-M was ideologically opposed to policies of liberalisation and privatisation as well as the World Bank, it faced
definite constraints at the local level that led the party to support reforms. Local political challenges from Maoist
groups that openly use violence (the People’s War Group) and the opportunity of gaining proximity to the district
administration through school reform implementation compelled the CPI-M to eschew ideology and engage
strategically. The STU used this proximity to champion teachers’ issues with the district administration, gain teacher
loyalty and out-manoeuvre competing unions. Overall, the policy of school decentralisation was used by Naidu to
create a local cadre of party loyalists through a process of ‘centralised’ control from above.
Bihar presented a sharp contrast to Andhra Pradesh as a wider agenda of development was missing in the state.
With respect to teacher policies, the state adopted confrontational rather than collaborative strategies, creating no
allies for reforms. The state also gave up on the policy of recruitment of full-time teachers and proposed filling all
vacancies with part-time teachers hired on contract. This opened up another arena of institutional conflict, between
the judiciary and the government, forcing sharp reversals and even abandonment of policy. In such a scenario of
policy dead-locks and weak implementation, even technically well-designed school decentralisation policies could
not be implemented due to weak support from political leaders and local elite capture.
In short, political skills, collaborative strategies and centralised political control over school committees were critical
elements in the implementation of school reforms in Andhra Pradesh.Bihar, meanwhile, was unable to effect change
owing to severe constraints posed by confrontations with interests and institutions. In both states, however, the
interaction of the poor with schools and the local state was a process of struggle, indicative of the challenges that lie
ahead.
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